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Decision problems are the problems whose answer is either YES or NO. As the quantum analogue
of NP (nondeterministic polynomial time), the class QMA (quantum Merlin-Arthur) contains the
decision problems whose YES instance can be verified efficiently with a quantum computer. The
problem of deciding the group non-membership (GNM) of a group element is known to be in QMA.
Previous works on the verification of GNM required a quantum circuit with O(n5) group oracle
calls. Here we propose an efficient way to verify GNM problems, reducing the circuit depth to O(1)
and the number of qubits by half. We further experimentally demonstrate the scheme, in which
two-element subgroups in a four-element group are employed for the verification task. A significant
completeness-soundness gap is observed in the experiment.
Introduction— Quantum effect can be used to en-
hance information processing in many ways. Besides
speeding up solving certain problems [1–3], quantum
computers can also be used to construct novel interac-
tive proof systems (IPS) [4, 5], which leads to fruitful
studies in blind quantum computing [6–8], quantum zero-
knowledge proof systems [9, 10] and multiprover interac-
tive proof systems [11, 12], etc. An IPS involves a veri-
fier and (potentially multiple) provers, where the verifier
aims at solving certain problems by exchanging messages
with the provers.
IPS can be used to classify decision problems, the prob-
lems whose answers can only be YES or NO. For exam-
ple, nondeterministic polynomial time (NP), one of the
most important complexity classes, can be described by
an IPS, with a classical verifier and a single computa-
tionally unbounded prover exchanging one round of clas-
sical message [13, 14]. Specifically, NP contains decision
problems that, for a YES instance, there exists certain
proof message, with which the YES instance can be ver-
ified in polynomial time by a classical computer. NP
can be generalized to the quantum realm naturally and
the quantum analogue is called quantum Merlin-Arthur
(QMA) [14, 15]. In QMA, the proof message is replaced
by a quantum state and the verifier can use a quantum
computer to process it.
Since a classical verifier can be simulated by a quantum
computer and a classical message can be described by a
quantum state, every problem belongs to NP is also in
QMA, i.e., NP ⊆ QMA. However, it remains an unsolved
problem whether QMA is strictly larger than NP and the
group non-membership (GNM) problem is believed to be
a possible candidate that falls in QMA but not in NP [15–
18]. Previous works have shown potential quantum ad-
vantage on verifying YES instances of this problem. It
has been proven that the GNM problem is not in NPB [17]
for a certain group oracle B. Also, Watrous proved
GNM(B) ∈ QMAB for every B by giving quantum proofs
and a verification process which can be efficiently done
by a quantum computer [18]. Furthermore, Watrous con-
jectured that certain quantum proofs, which is similar to
the one constructed for proving GNM(B) ∈ QMAB, can
be used in many other decision problems of finite groups,
such as the problems of deciding proper subgroups and
simple groups [18].
Because of the potential applications of quantum
IPS and the growing power of near-term quantum de-
vices [19, 20], it has become a meaningful question that
how to make quantum IPS more friendly for near-term
quantum devices. The verification of the GNM problem
is of special importance as it is closely related to the
verification of a wide spectrum of group properties and
is expected to have quantum advantage. However, Wa-
trous’s process is not favorable for near-term devices as
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2it requires too deep quantum circuits [18, 21].
In this work, we proposed a new verification process
which is more friendly to near-term quantum devices
based on Watrous’s protocol. The depth of quantum cir-
cuit is reduced to O(1) for the groups with at most 2n
elements, whereas previous work required O(n5) oracle
calls in one circuit. The number of qubits needed is also
half reduced. Our new process makes it easier to use the
verification of GNM as a part of near-term quantum ap-
plications such as quantum cryptography protocols. We
also demonstrate our new process by an all-optical setup.
Various photonic quantum proofs are sent to the optical
systems and a significant completeness-soundness gap is
presented, showing the validity of our process.
Group non-membership problem— First, we for-
mally give the definition of the group non-membership
problem here [18]. Let G be a finite group and S =
〈g1, . . . , gk〉 be a subgroup generated by group elements
g1, . . . , gk ∈ G. Given an element x ∈ G, the group non-
membership problem is to decide whether x is outside the
subgroup S. If x /∈ S, x is a YES instance; otherwise, x
is a NO instance.
To analyze the problem with minimum assumption on
the group, usually the framework of black-box groups [22]
is adopted. In this work, we adopt the same framework
as in Watrous’s work [18] for the quantum group ora-
cle, in which the quantum group element labels are a set
of mutually orthogonal quantum states. We denote the
quantum label corresponding to the group element g by
|ψg〉 and we denote the space spanned by the quantum
labels of elements in G by span{G} := span{|ψg1〉 〈ψg2 | :
g1, g2 ∈ G}. The quantum group oracle is defined to be
able to detect whether a state is in span{G} and carry
out right multiplication M(·) as M(g2) |ψg1〉 = |ψg1g2〉.
In Watrous’s process [18], the quantum proof for the
non-membership can be a uniform superposition of the
elements in a coset αS of the subgroup S for any α ∈ G,
where αS is defined as αS := {αs|s ∈ S}. Explicitly, it
can be written as,
|Qproof〉 = 1√|S| ∑
g∈αS
|ψg〉 , (1)
where |S| is the element number of the subgroup S.
This state is invariant under right multiplications of
the elements in S because they map the elements in
αS bijectively to αS. On the other hand, if x /∈ S,
the result state is orthogonal to the original one as
〈Qproof |M(x) |Qproof〉 = 0 since (αS)x and αS do not
share common elements.
Next, we introduce the core quantum circuit that plays
a central role in the verification process. The core cir-
cuit is similar to the swap test circuit and is depicted in
Fig. 1. The outcome of the core circuit is defined to be the
measurement outcome of the control qubit. We denote
by core(x, |Qproof〉) = s the event of obtaining the mea-
surement outcome s ∈ {0, 1} in one run of the core circuit
|0⟩ H • H 
|Qproof⟩ M(x)
FIG. 1. Core circuit. The circuit is similar to the swap test
circuit and aims to check whether the input state is invari-
ant under certain group multiplication. With a correct proof
state, if x ∈ S, the measurement outcome is always 0; if x /∈ S,
the measurement outcome is 1 with probability 0.5.
with input state |Qproof〉 and group member x. The out-
come can show the effect of the multiplication by x on the
input state. For core(x, |Qproof〉), if x ∈ S, the outcome
can only be 0 as |Qproof〉 is invariant under the multipli-
cation. If x /∈ S, the probability of obtaining 1 is 0.5
as the state after multiplication is orthogonal to |Qproof〉.
Therefore, with the proof state, the non-membership of
an element can be verified when the outcome 1 is ob-
tained.
However, a malicious prover may send bogus proof
states that deviate from Eq. (1) and give incorrect out-
comes. Therefore, to ensure the soundness of the ver-
ification, the verifier has to do a property checking on
the received proof state, i.e., check the state is invari-
ant under the group multiplication M(s) for any s ∈ S,
so that the elements in S cannot be proven to be out-
side S. In the original process [18], to verify the proof
received is valid, the verifier needs to uniformly sample
the subgroup elements in a reversible way and produce a
quantum superposition of the quantum labels∑
g∈S
ai |g〉 |garbage(g)〉 , (2)
where {ai} should be nearly uniform. However, the re-
versible sampling requires O(n5) calls of the group oracle
in the quantum circuit according to Remark 8.3 in [21]
and requires the verifier to keep at least one more quan-
tum group element label.
Simplified verification— In this work, we reduce
both the circuit depth and qubit number needed for the
verification of GNM. The simplification relies on the tech-
nique which we call Random State Inspection (RSI). RSI
can be used in verification processes that includes a prop-
erty checking phase of the proof state. Usually, in these
processes the property checking and the after verifica-
tion (verification after property ensured) are done in one
quantum circuit. Watrous’s process is such a process. In
Watrous’s process, the verifier first ensures that the re-
ceived proof state is invariant under multiplication with
subgroup members by multiplying it with the state in
Eq. (2) and then carries out the verification with the core
circuit. RSI provides a way to reduce the circuit depth
by separating the property checking and the verification
after property checking.
3In RSI, the prover is required to send m registers that
carry copies of a state to the verifier. The verifier ran-
domly selects one register to reserve and apply indepen-
dent test channels to the other m − 1 registers to check
the property of the states that they carry. If all the
m − 1 registers pass the property checking, the verifier
accepts the reserved register for the later verification pro-
cess. Otherwise, the verifier rejects. We prove that, if all
the other registers have passed the test channel, the prob-
ability for the reserved register to fail passing the test
channel if tested can be bounded to 0 at speed O(1/m)
even when the m registers are entangled. The verifier can
then directly apply the after verification on the reserved
register as its property is ensured. By RSI, the circuit
depth needed in the verification is reduced to that of the
property checking or the after verification.
More important, we simplify the property checking
process for the proof state in GNM. Rather than using
the state in Eq. (2) which needs O(n5) quantum group
operations to produce, we propose a test channel in which
a subgroup element s is first classically sampled from a
nearly uniform distribution by Babai’s algorithm [21], fol-
lowed by checking whether core(s, ρ) = 0. Here, ‘nearly
uniform’ means the probability for s to be any subgroup
elements is in (1/|S| − 1/22n, 1/|S|+ 1/22n). We denote
the probability for a state ρ to pass the test channel by
Pr(core(s, ρ) = 0). We prove that for any element g ∈ S
and any quantum state ρ ∈ span{G}, the probability of
incorrectly proving the non-membership of g ∈ S, i.e.
having core(g, ρ) = 1, can be bounded as,
Pr(core(g, ρ) = 1) ≤ 4 (1− Pr(core(s, ρ) = 0)) . (3)
By RSI, we can ensure Pr(core(s, ρ) = 0) is high
enough and therefore bound the error probability
Pr(core(g, ρ) = 1).
To summarize, in our new process, we split the prop-
erty checking of the proof state and the verification af-
ter property checking into different circuits by RSI. We
also use a new property checking process which requires
much less quantum resources. As a result, the verifier
only needs to run the core circuits, which is shallow, for
many times, rather than run a deep circuit with O(n5)
group operations. Also, the number of qubits that the
verifier needs to keep is halved because the verifier no
longer needs the keep the state in Eq. (2). Detailed and
rigorous analysis can be found in the supplementary ma-
terial.
Experimental setup—In this work, an experimen-
tal demonstration of the our new verification process
is carried out. We consider an abelian group G =
{〈A,B〉|AB = BA,A2 = B2 = E}. The four elements in G
are encoded in the polarization degree of freedom of pho-
tons as |ψE〉 = |V H〉 , |ψA〉 = |HV 〉 , |ψB〉 = |HH〉 and
|ψAB〉) = |V V 〉, in which |H〉 and |V 〉 denote the hori-
zontal and vertical polarization, respectively. They can
together span the whole two-qubit Hilbert space. The
optical realization of the controlled right multiplication
of {A, B, AB, E} are illustrated in Fig. 2(a). The sub-
groups we choose are S = {E,A} and S′ = {E,AB}. The
quantum proof states for S and S′ used in the experiment
are |Qproof〉 = 1√2 (|ψB〉+ |ψAB〉) = 1√2 (|HH〉+ |V V 〉), and
|Q′proof〉 = 1√2 (|ψB〉+ |ψA〉) = 1√2 (|HH〉+ |HV 〉), respec-
tively.
In the experimental, we put |Qproof〉 , |Q′proof〉, |ψA〉 and
|ψB〉 in the core circuit with right multiplication by
E,A,B and AB. The full experimental setup is shown
in Fig. 2(b). The input states are generated by pump-
ing two identically cut type-I beta-barium-borate (BBO)
crystals whose optic axes are aligned in mutually per-
pendicular planes [23] with an ultraviolet (UV) source.
The UV pulses is frequency doubled from a mode-locked
Ti:sapphire laser centered at 800 nm with 130 fs pulse
width and 76 MHz repetition rate. After compensat-
ing the birefringence effect between H and V in BBO
crystals with quartz plates (QP), maximally entangled
photon pairs of the forms |Qproof〉 = (|HH〉+ |V V 〉)/
√
2
are produced [24]. Furthermore, by adjusting the po-
larization of pump pulses and down-conversion photons,
the other states of |ψB〉 = |HH〉, |ψA〉 = |HV 〉 and
|Q′proof〉 = (|HH〉 + |HV 〉)/
√
2 are produced. The in-
put photons are then sent to one of the quantum circuits
in Fig. 2 to perform the core circuit with different group
multiplications. In our setup, the Mach-Zehnder interfer-
ometer is realized by Sagnac interferometer in which the
path information of photons is regarded as the control
qubit [25]. In a Sagnac interferometer, an optical non-
polarization beam splitter (BS), worked as the Hadamard
gates on control qubit, is used to separate the beam into
two paths 1 and 2 which are treated as the control qubit
|0〉 and |1〉 respectively. Here, the BS is chosen to split
50 : 50 for 0◦ angle of incidence which could be decrease
the difference of split ratio of different polarizations. In
the path |1〉, a half-wave plate (HWP) is used to imple-
ment CNOT gates with set at 45◦ to reverse the pho-
ton polarization. The visibilities of two Sagnac interfer-
ometers are 96.7 ± 0.4% and 95.9 ± 0.4%, respectively.
Note that, for the circuit E with E multiplication, there
is no CNOT gate and the HWP is set at 0◦. Beams
1 and 2 combine in the BS and then are separated as
beams 3 and 4. The polarization of photons are analyzed
on the outputs of beams 3 and 4 by polarization beam
splitters (PBS), HWP and quarter-wave plates (QWP).
The photons are detected by single photon detectors (D)
equipped with 3 nm interference filters (IF).
For the circuit A, which implements the multiplication
by A, the probability P0 of detecting |0〉 equals the sum
of coincidence count (CC) of detectors located at a3 and
b3 and CC of detectors located at a4 and b4, where a3 is
the output port 3 of the SI on the side of a, and similarly
hereinafter. The probability P1 of detecting |1〉 equals
the sum of CC of a3 and b4 and CC of a4 and b3. On
4𝑎
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FIG. 2. (Color online). Circuit mapping and experimental setup. (a) The circuits for group multiplications in the first line
are deduced from the quantum labels for the elements and can be easily proven. They are modified to its controlled version
and used to construct the core circuits for the verification process in the second line. Optical paths are presented in the third
line. Here, two beam splitters (BSs) building a Mach-Zehnder interferometer (MZI) are used to play the role as two Hadamard
operations on the control qubit which is realized with the path information. One path is regarded as |0〉 and the other one is
|1〉. A half wave plate (HWP) is placed in |1〉 path to act the CNOT gate on the polarization qubit with the optical axis at
45◦. (b) Experimental setups. Entangled photon pairs are produced by pumping BBO and using quartz plates (QP) on the
above panel. Two photons are sent to the sides a and b respectively. On each side, a Sagnac interferometer (SI) shown on the
bottom panel in detail is constructed to realize the MZI. In a SI, a HWP is placed in |1〉 path (shown in orange beam and
marked as 2) and a phase compensation (PC) crystal is located in |0〉 (shown in blue beam and marked as 1). Measurement
unit (MU) consisting of a quarter wave plate (QWP), a HWP, a polarization beam splitter (PBS) and a single photon detector
equipped with an interferometer filter (IF) is placed on each output port (marked as 3 and 4) of SI. Note, in this figure, unitary
of multiplying by A is realized. With removing the SI, we can implement different quantum circuits.
the other hand, for the case of circuit B, according to the
corresponding mapping relation where the Sagnac inter-
ferometer is only placed in the a side, the probability of
detecting |0〉 equals the CC of a3 and b, and the probabil-
ity of |1〉 equals the CC of a4 and b. The similar methods
suit the other circuits AB and E.
Besides the interference visibility introduced above,
two Sagnac interferometers are further verified with the
input state of (|HH〉+ |V V 〉)/√2 which is prepared with
a fidelity of 95.9 ± 1.0%. For the Sagnac interferometer
appearing in the E circuit, the output state generated
from the CC of a3 and b remains the maximally entan-
gled state and is achieved experimentally with a fidelity
of 95.3 ± 1.0%. For the other interferometer which is
used in circuit AB, without inserting the CNOT gate,
the output state generated from the CC of a and b3 is
also the same with the input state and achieves a fidelity
of 94.2 ± 1.4%. We further verify other output cases of
the interferometers and achieve high fidelities for them.
The real and imaginary parts of all corresponding density
matrices are presented in the supplementary material.
Experimental results— Equipped with the experi-
ment setup, we first carried out our new process on the
group S. To demonstrate the test channel in our verifi-
cation process, the correct proof |Qproof〉 as well as the
bogus proofs |Q′proof〉, |ψA〉 and |ψB〉 are produced and
sent to the core circuit with multiplication by A. A
state passes the test if the control qubit is detected to
be in |0〉. The results are shown in Fig. 3(a). We find
that the probabilities for a bogus proof to pass the state
test do not exceed 0.518 ± 0.017 and have a significant
gap towards the probability 0.955 ± 0.006 for a correct
proof state |Qproof〉 to pass. Then we show how the non-
membership of an element g can be verified with the cor-
rect proof state |Qproof〉. The group non-membership of
g is verified when |1〉 is detected in the core circuit with
multiplication by g. The experimental result is shown
in Fig. 3(b). We find the probabilities for |Qproof〉 to be
accepted is higher than 0.496± 0.009 for B,AB /∈ S′ and
lower than 0.045 ± 0.006 for E,A ∈ S′. The above anal-
ysis implies that if the prover sends m registers and the
verifier chooses m − 1 registers to test, the probability
pc for a group of correct proof state to be accepted is
greater than 0.496(0.949)m−1. In contrast, the probabil-
ity for m bogus state to pass the tests is only (0.518)m−1
. For a general bogus proof, our theory shows that the
5FIG. 3. (Color online). Experimental results. (a), (c) The
detecting probabilities of |0〉 with different input proof states
for the circuit A and AB, respectively. (b), (d) The proba-
bility for the proof states |Qproof〉 = |HH〉 + |V V 〉)/
√
2 and
|Q′proof〉 = (|HH〉+|HV 〉)/
√
2 to prove group non-membership
for every group elements (detecting the control qubit in |1〉).
The histograms and black points are theoretical and experi-
mental results, respectively. All error bars are estimated to be
standard deviation from the statistical variation of the photon
counts assumed to follow a Poisson distribution
probability ps for it to be accepted is bounded by
16
7(m−1) .
Therefore, the gap pc − ps is maximized when m = 14
and the maximal value is 0.075.
For the other subgroup S′, the result is similar. The
bogus proofs become |ψA〉, |ψB〉, |Qproof〉 and the correct
proof becomes |Q′proof〉. The probabilities for the bogus
proofs to pass the test channel do not exceed 0.503 ±
0.008 and for the correct proof |Q′proof〉, the corresponding
probability is 0.980 ± 0.003 as shown in Fig. 3(c). We
find that the probability for |Q′proof〉 to be accepted when
used for verifying GNM is higher than 0.481 ± 0.017 for
B,A /∈ S′ and is lower than 0.020 ± 0.003 for E,AB ∈ S′
as shown in Fig. 3(d). In this case, ps is still bounded
by 167(m−1) and pc = 0.481(0.980)
m−1. The gap pc − ps is
maximized when m = 19 and the maximal value is 0.207.
These completeness-soundness gaps indicates the success
of our experiment.
Conclusion— In this work, a new quantum verifica-
tion process for the GNM problem is proposed, in which
the required quantum resources are greatly reduced. We
experimentally demonstrate the verification scheme in an
all-optical setup. Our novel verification process can be
used to construct more quantum protocols for near-term
quantum devices. Furthermore, as it is very likely that
similar verification process of GNM can be used in other
problems of finite groups, it will be interesting if this
validity was formally proven and experimentally demon-
strated.
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7SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL
For conciseness, in the supplementary material we use |g〉 rather than |ψg〉 to denote the quantum label of group
element g. First we formally give the definition of Random State Inspection (RSI) and the test channel used in our
new process here.
Protocol 1: Random State Inspection
1. Prover sends m registers to the verifier. The registers should carry the same quantum state.
2. Verifier uniformly randomly reserves one register and applies a test channel T to the other m− 1 registers. The
test channel T should map each register to a one-qubit state, with |0〉 indicating pass and |1〉 indicating fail.
3. Verifier measures the outputs of the test channels in the computational basis. The reserved register is accepted if
and only if all outcomes are 0.
Protocol 2: Proof State Test Channel T
1. Verifier uses the group oracle to check whether the state of the register is in span{G}. If it is the case, output |1〉.
2. Verifier randomly samples a subgroup element by Babai’s algorithm [21] by a classical computer, with the
probability of sampling each element in ( 1|S| − 122n , 1|S| + 122n ). Denote the element sampled by s.
3. Verifier applies the core circuit to the register with element s by the group oracle.
4. Verifier gives the control qubit in the core circuit as the output.
With Protocol 1 and Protocol 2, we summarize our new verification process here.
Protocol 3: Verification of Group Non-membership
1. Prover sends m registers with state in Eq. (1) to the verifier, trying to prove that the element g in the group G is
not in the subgroup S of G. There are at most 2n elements in G.
2. (The test subroutine) Verifier runs Protocol 1 with test channel T defined in Protocol 2 and obtains the reserved
register.
3. (The prove subroutine) Verifier applies the core circuit with g to the reserved register after checking the state of
the reserved register is in the space span{G} = span{|g1〉 〈g2| : g1, g2 ∈ G} (the space spanned by the valid labels)
by the group oracle. The prover passes this subroutine if the outcome of the core circuit is 1 and the state of the
register is found in the valid space span{G}.
4. The prover passes the verification process if he passes both the test and the prove subroutine.
Note that RSI can achieve its goal even when the registers are mixed and entangled. Therefore, a quantum proof
ρs can be seen as carried by the registers. To prove the validity of Protocol 3, we need to prove its completeness and
soundness. We first prove the completeness of it.
Theorem 1 (Completeness). In Protocol 3, if the prover and the verifier are honest, for any group element g not in
the subgroup, the probability for the prover to prove the non-membership of g is 12 .
Proof. In the test subroutine, the honest prover will always pass the test because for a honest proof state |Qproof〉
Pr(core(s, |Qproof〉)) = 1. Then, in the prove subroutine, the copy used in this phase has a probability of 12 to be
accepted. This can be proved by observing how the proof state is transformed by the core circuit. The transformation
is
1√|S| ∑
s∈αS
|s〉 → 1
2
√|S|
(
|0〉
∑
s∈αS
(|s〉+ |sg〉) + |1〉
∑
s∈αS
(|s〉 − |sg〉)
)
, (4)
where the control qubit is put in the left. The probability to obtain |1〉 after measuring the control qubit is
p =
∥∥∥∥∥ 12√|S| ∑
s∈αS
(|s〉 − |sg〉)
∥∥∥∥∥
2
. (5)
8Because when g /∈ S, we have sg /∈ αS and because for any two s1, s2 ∈ αS, s1 6= s2, we have s1g 6= s2g, the norm can
be easily calculated and we can obatin p = 12 . Therefore, the probability to prove the non-membership of an element
g /∈ S is 12 by Protocol 3.
All the verification processes can be done in polynomial time with a quantum computer. According to Thm. (2),
only polynomial number of registers are required. The process of every register is only the core circuit with a random
group element. The sampling of random group element can also be efficiently done according to Thm. (3).
Below, we denote ρr as the density matrix of the reserved register. Also, we denote (test(ρs) = 1) as the event that
the prover passes this subroutine and (test(ρs) = 0) otherwise. In addition, we denote (T (ρr) = 1) as ρr passes the
test channel (not the test subroutine). Similarly, we denote (prove(g, ρs) = 1) as the event that the proof state passes
the verification process, and (prove(g, ρs) = 0) otherwise.
Theorem 2 (Soundness). For any g ∈ S, the probability to incorrectly verify its non-membership using Protocol 3
vanishes as,
Pr(prove(g, ρs) = 1) ≤ 8
m
, (6)
for any proof state ρs.
Proof. In this proof we assume that the quantum proof sent by the prover is always in the valid space span{G} =
span{|g1〉 〈g2| : g1, g2 ∈ G} because in Protocol 3 the verifier always check whether the states is in span{G} before
doing any operation on them. After the checking, the quantum proof is either projected to span{G} or rejected.
Therefore, the prover making the quantum proof not in span{G} will only decrease the probability for it to be
accepted.
To prove the non-membership of g, the registers should first pass the test subroutine. By Prop. (1), the probability
Pr(test(ρr) = 1) for the reserved copy ρr to pass the test is bounded as
Pr(T (ρr) = 1|test(ρs) = 1) ≥ 1− ( 1
Pr(test(ρs) = 1)
− 1) 1
m− 1 . (7)
By Prop. (2), we know that the the high probability to pass the test means low error probability to prove the non-
membership. For the reserved copy, provided that the test subroutine has been passed, the probability of incorrectly
proving GNM by it can be given by,
Pr(core(g, ρr) = 1|test(ρs) = 1) ≤ 1− Pr(T (ρr) = 1|test(ρs) = 1)
K(1− |S|22n )
, (8)
where
1
K
= 1− cos
(⌈ |g|
2
⌉
2
|g|pi
)
≤ 2 . (9)
Combining the equations, we can obtain the probability of incorrectly accepting the proof state
Pr(test(ρs) = 1, core(g, ρr) = 1)
= Pr(test(ρs) = 1) · Pr(core(g, ρr) = 1|test(ρs) = 1)
≤Pr(test(ρs) = 1)
K(1− |S|22n )
(1− Pr(T (ρr) = 1|test(ρs) = 1))
≤Pr(test(ρs) = 1)
K(1− |S|22n )
(
1
Pr(test(ρs) = 1)
− 1) 1
m− 1
≤ 1
K
(1 +
1
2n+1 − 1)
1
m− 1
≤ 8
m
.
(10)
9Corollary 1. For the group G = {〈A,B〉|AB = BA,A2 = B2 = E} used in the experimental demonstration in the
main text, the probability to incorrectly verify the non-membership of a subgroup element g except E using Protocol 3
vanishes as,
Pr(prove(g, ρs) = 1) ≤ (16
7
)
1
m− 1 , (11)
for any proof state ρs.
Proof. The rank of the group elements in G = {〈A,B〉|AB = BA,A2 = B2 = E} are all 2 except E. Therefore 1/K = 2.
Notice that there are 4 elements in G and n = 2, refer to Eq. (10), we have
Pr(test(ρs) = 1, core(g, ρr) = 1) ≤ 1
K
(1 +
1
2n+1 − 1)
1
m− 1 = 2(1 +
1
22+1 − 1)
1
m− 1 = (
16
7
)
1
m− 1 . (12)
Proposition 1. In Protocol 1, the probability Pr(T (ρr) = 1|test(ρs) = 1) for the reserved register ρr to pass the test
in the condition that all other registers have passed the tests can be bounded as
Pr(T (ρr) = 1|test(ρs) = 1) ≥ 1− ( 1
Pr(test(ρs) = 1)
− 1) 1
m− 1 , (13)
where Pr(test(ρs) = 1) is the overall probability for the registers to pass Protocol 1.
Proof. After applying T to every register in ρs, we can obtain an m-qubit state as
T⊗M (ρs) =
∑
s1,s2∈{0,1}m
as1,s2 |s1〉 〈s2| . (14)
Then we try to bound the probability for passing RSI. For the sake of conciseness, we denote as,s by as. Also, we
denote the as in which s is 0 in every indices except in index i as ai=1. We have
Pr(test(ρs) = 1) =
1
m
m∑
i=1
(a0m + ai=1) = a0m +
1
m
m∑
i=1
ai=1
≤ a0m + 1
m
(1− a0m),
(15)
and
a0m ≥ mPr(test(ρs) = 1)− 1
m− 1 . (16)
Decompose the density matrix ρr of the reserved register after being applied with channel T as
ρr =
∑
s1,s2∈{0,1}2
rs1,s2 |s1〉 〈s2| . (17)
According to the definition of the conditional probability Pr(A|B) = Pr(A ∩B)/Pr(B), we have
Pr(T (ρr) = 1|test(ρs) = 1) = a0
m
Pr(test(ρs) = 1)
≥1− ( 1
Pr(test(ρs) = 1)
− 1) 1
m− 1 .
(18)
Corollary 2. After Protocol 1, if the reserved register is tested, the probability Pr(T (ρr) = 0, test(ρs) = 1) for the
reserved register to fail passing the test channel together with that the RSI is not rejected is less than O(1/m).
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Proof. By Prop. (1) we know that
Pr(T (ρr) = 1|test(ρs) = 1) ≥ 1− ( 1
Pr(test(ρs) = 1)
− 1) 1
m− 1 . (19)
Easily we can know that
Pr(T (ρr) = 1|test(ρs) = 1) Pr(test(ρs) = 1) ≥ Pr(test(ρs) = 1)− (1− Pr(test(ρs) = 1)) 1
m− 1 , (20)
Pr(T (ρr) = 1, test(ρs) = 1) ≥ Pr(test(ρs) = 1)− (1− Pr(test(ρs) = 1)) 1
m− 1 , (21)
Pr(T (ρr) = 1, test(ρs) = 1) ≥ Pr(test(ρs) = 1)−O(1/m), (22)
Pr(T (ρr) = 1, test(ρs) = 1) ≥ Pr(T (ρr) = 1, test(ρs) = 1) + Pr(T (ρr) = 0, test(ρs) = 1)−O(1/m), (23)
Pr(T (ρr) = 0, test(ρs) = 1) ≤ O(1/m). (24)
Proposition 2. For any state ρr ∈ span{|g1〉 〈g2| : g1, g2 ∈ G}, the probability Pr(T (ρr) = 1) for it to pass the test
in Protocol 2 and the probability Pr(core(g, ρr) = 1) for a group element g ∈ S to be proven not in S by ρr, has the
relation that
Pr(core(g, ρr) = 1) ≤ 1− Pr(T (ρr) = 1)
K(1− |S|22n )
, (25)
where
1
K
= 1− cos
(
d |g|
2
e 2|g|pi
)
. (26)
Proof. First, if g = e, the verifier can immediately reject the proof since e is contained in every group. In this case
Pr(prove(g, ρs) = 1) = 0 and the inequality holds. In this following proof, we assume g 6= e and therefore |g| 6= 1.
To prove Eq. (25), we just need to prove it for any pure state ρr = |ψ〉 〈ψ|, because if this theorem is true for any
pure state, then for any mix state ρ =
∑
i qi |i〉 〈i| ,
Pr(core(g, ρr) = 1) =
∑
i
qi Pr(core(g, |i〉) = 1)
≤
∑
i
qi
1− Pr(T (|i〉) = 1)
K(1− |S|22n )
=
1− Pr(T (ρr) = 1)
K(1− |S|22n )
.
(27)
Therefore, we start to prove this theorem for pure state here. We can extend any pure state |ψ〉 as
|ψ〉 =
∑
α∈G
βα |α〉 (28)
For simplicity, in this proof we denote Pr(core(g, |ψ〉) = 1) by p(g). We want to prove
p(g) ≤ 1− Pr(T (|ψ〉) = 1)
K(1− |S|22n )
. (29)
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In Protocol 3, the state is tested as∑
α∈G
βα |α〉 → 1
2
|0〉
∑
α∈G
βα(|α〉+ |αg〉) + 1
2
|1〉
∑
α∈G
βα(|α〉 − |αg〉). (30)
The probability for a element g ∈ G to be verified by the state is
p(g) =
1
4
∥∥∥∥∥∑
α∈G
βα(|α〉 − |αg〉)
∥∥∥∥∥
2
=
1
4
∑
α∈G
(|βα|2 + |βαg−1 |2 − 2Re(β∗αβαg−1))
=
1
4
(2−
∑
α∈G
2Re(β∗αβαg−1)),
(31)
by which we can obtain ∑
α∈G
Re(β∗αβαg−1) = 1− 2p(g). (32)
Decompose G by the cosets G/S = {αS|α ∈ G}, where αS = {αs|s ∈ S}. Easily one can find that if h ∈ αS,
hS = αS. By this decomposition we sum up Eq. (32) and obtain∑
s∈S
(1− 2p(s)) =
∑
s∈S
∑
α∈G
Re(β∗αβαs−1)
= Re(
∑
α∈G
β∗α
∑
s∈αS
βs)
= Re(
∑
αS∈G/S
∑
h∈αS
β∗h
∑
s∈hS
βs)
= Re(
∑
αS∈G/S
∑
h∈αS
β∗h
∑
s∈αS
βs)
=
∑
αS∈G/S
|
∑
h∈αS
βh|2,
(33)
and therefore ∑
s∈S
p(s) =
1
2
(|S| −
∑
αS∈G/S
|
∑
h∈αS
βh|2). (34)
On the other hand, we want to get the probability Pr(T (|ψ〉) = 1) for this state to pass the test. Notice that the
probability for the state to pass the test by s is
Pr(core(s, |ψ〉) = 0) = 1− Pr(core(s, |ψ〉) = 1) = 1− p(s). (35)
Also, in a test the subgroup element used is randomly sampled by Babai’s algorithm. By Thm. (3) we know that in
polynomial time we can sample every subgroup element s with
Pr(s is sampled) ∈ ( 1|S| −
1
22n
,
1
|S| +
1
22n
). (36)
Therefore we have
Pr(T (|ψ〉) = 1) =
∑
s∈S
Pr(s is sampled)(1− p(s))
= 1−
∑
s∈S
Pr(s is sampled)p(s)
≤ 1− ( 1|S| −
1
22n
)
1
2
(|S| −
∑
αS∈G/S
|
∑
h∈αS
βh|2)
=
1
2
+
|S|
22n+1
+
1
2
(
1
|S| −
1
22n
)
∑
αS∈G/S
|
∑
h∈αS
βh|2.
(37)
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To give a relation between p(g) and Pr(T (|ψ〉) = 1), we want to know the maximum of
f(~β) =
∑
αS∈G/S
|
∑
h∈αS
βh|2 (38)
under the condition that
b(~β) =
∑
α∈G
Re(β∗αβαg−1) = B = 1− 2p(g) (39)
and
l(~β) =
∑
h∈G
|βh|2 = 1. (40)
We should survey more carefully the structure of the coset αS. Define cycle(c, g) as c〈g〉 = {cgi|i ∈ Z}. A coset
can be decomposed into disjoint orbits. Let CY C(αS, g) be a set of c such that for any c1, c2 ∈ CY C(αS, g),
cycle(c1, g) 6= cycle(c2, g) if c1 6= c2; and αS = ∪c∈CY C(αS,g)cycle(c, g). By these definition we can further decompose
the summation as
∑
α∈G
Re(β∗αβαg−1) =
∑
αS∈G/S
∑
c∈CY C(αS,g)
|g|∑
k=1
Re(β∗cg−k+1βcg−k). (41)
Define
fα(~β) =
∑
c∈CY C(αS,g)
|g|∑
k=1
βcg−k , (42)
bα(~β) =
∑
c∈CY C(αS,g)
|g|∑
k=1
Re(β∗cg−k+1βcg−k), (43)
lα(~β) =
∑
c∈CY C(αS,g)
|g|∑
k=1
|βcg−k |2. (44)
Therefore
f(~β) =
∑
αS∈G/S
|
∑
c∈CY C(αS,g)
|g|∑
k=1
βcg−k |2 =
∑
αS∈G/S
|fα(~β)|2. (45)
We want to know the maximum of fα when bα and lα are fixed. To find out this relationship we first define
oc(~β) = |
|g|∑
k=1
βcg−k |2, (46)
bc(~β) =
|g|∑
k=1
Re(β∗cg−k+1βcg−k), (47)
lc(~β) =
|g|∑
k=1
|βcg−k |2. (48)
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We need to study the maximum of oc when gc and lc are fixed. Decompose every βh into real part and imaginary
part as
βh = Rh + iIh. (49)
Therefore
lc(~β) =
|g|∑
n=1
|βcg−n |2 =
|g|∑
n=1
R2cg−n +
|g|∑
n=1
I2cg−n = l
R
c (~R) + l
I
c (~I), (50)
bc(~β) =
|g|∑
n=1
Re(β∗cg−n+1βcg−n) =
|g|∑
n=1
R∗cg−n+1Rcg−n +
|g|∑
n=1
I∗cg−n+1Icg−n, = b
R
c (
~R) + bIc(
~I), (51)
oc(~β) = |
|g|∑
n=1
βcg−n |2 = |
|g|∑
n=1
Rcg−n |2 + |
|g|∑
n=1
Icg−n |2 = oRc (~R) + oIc(~I). (52)
By Corollary 3 we know that when bRc and l
R
c are fixed,
max oRc (
~R) = K|g|(bRc − lRc ) + |g|lRc = K|g|(bRc +
1−K
K
lRc ), (53)
where
K−1 = 1− cos
(
d |g|
2
e 2|g|pi
)
. (54)
Then we get max oc(~β) under the condition that b
R
c (~R) + b
I
c(~I) = bc(
~β) and lRc (~R) + l
I
c (~I) = lc(
~β). That is
max oc(~β) = max(o
R
c (
~R) + oIc(
~I))
= max
(
K|g|(bRc +
1−K
K
lRc ) +K|g|(bIc +
1−K
K
lIc )
)
= max
(
K|g|(bRc + bIc +
1−K
K
(lRc + l
I
c ))
)
=K|g|(bc + 1−K
K
lc).
(55)
Therefore we have
max fα(~β) ≤
∑
c∈CY C(αS,g)
√
max oc
=
|S|
|g|
∑
c∈CY C(αS,g)
|g|
|S|
√
max oc
≤ |S||g|
√√√√ ∑
c∈CY C(αS,g)
|g|
|S| max oc
=
√
|S|
|g|
√√√√ ∑
c∈CY C(αS,g)
K|g|(bc + 1−K
K
lc)
=
√
K|S|
√√√√ ∑
c∈CY C(αS,g)
(bc +
1−K
K
lc)
=
√
K|S|
√
bα +
1−K
K
lα.
(56)
14
Then
max f(~β) = max
∑
αS∈G/S
|fα(~β)|2
≤
∑
αS∈G/S
|max fα(~β)|2
=
∑
αS∈G/S
K|S|(bα + 1−K
K
lα)
= K|S|(B + 1−K
K
) = |S|(KB + 1−K).
(57)
Finally
Pr(T (|ψ〉) = 1) ≤ 1
2
+
|S|
22n+1
+ (
1
|S| −
1
22n
)
1
2
|S|(KB + 1−K)
=
1
2
+
|S|
22n+1
+ (
1
|S| −
1
22n
)
1
2
|S|(K(1− 2p(g)) + 1−K)
=
1
2
+
|S|
22n+1
+ (
1
|S| −
1
22n
)
|S|
2
(1− 2Kp(g))
=
1
2
+
|S|
22n+1
+
1
2
(1− 2Kp(g))− |S|
22n+1
(1− 2Kp(g))
= 1 + (
|S|
22n
− 1)Kp(g).
(58)
p(g) ≤ 1− Pr(T (|ψ〉) = 1)
K(1− |S|22n )
. (59)
Here we show how to deduce the claim in the main text by Prop. (2).
Proof. Notice that 1K = 1− cos
(
d |g|2 e 2|g|pi
)
≤ 2 , |S| ≤ 2n and (1− |S|22n ) ≥ 12 , by the proposition below we can have
Pr(core(g, ρr) = 1) ≤ 4(1− Pr(T (ρr) = 1)). (60)
Proposition 3. Let R be a vector of n real numbers (n > 1). Under the condition that
∑n
i=1R
2
i = 1 and∑n
i=1RiRi+1 = b (Rn+1 is defined to be R1), the maximum of O = (
∑n
i=1Ri)
2 is
O =
n
1− cos(dn2 e 2npi) (b− 1) + n.
Proof. The Lagrangian multiplier of this problem is
F (R, λ) = (
n∑
i=1
Ri)
2 + λ1(
n∑
i=1
RiRi+1 − b) + λ2(
n∑
i=1
R2i − 1). (61)
The derivatives should be zero when O is maximized
∂F
∂Rk
= 2(
n∑
i=1
Ri) + λ1(Rk−1 +Rk+1) + 2λ2Rk = 0. (62)
Sum up the derivatives, we have
n∑
k=1
∂F
∂Rk
= 2n(
n∑
i=1
Ri) + 2λ1(
n∑
i=1
Ri) + 2λ2(
n∑
i=1
Ri) = 0 (63)
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and therefore
λ1 + λ2 = −n. (64)
In a similar way, we have
∂F
∂Rk
Rk = 2(
n∑
i=1
Ri)Rk + λ1(Rk−1Rk +RkRk+1) + 2λ2R2k = 0 (65)
and therefore
n∑
k=1
∂F
∂Rk
Rk = 2O + 2λ1b+ 2λ2 = 0. (66)
O = −λ1b+ λ1 + n. (67)
Also, by Eq. (62), we have
λ1(Rk−1 +Rk+1) + 2λ2Rk = λ1(Rk +Rk+2) + 2λ2Rk+1, (68)
and therefore
Rk + (2
λ2
λ1
− 1)Rk−1 − (2λ2
λ1
− 1)Rk−2 −Rk−3 = 0. (69)
The formula for each Rk can be obtained by the characteristic equation
x3 + Λx2 − Λx− 1 = 0, (70)
where
Λ = (2
λ2
λ1
− 1). (71)
The solutions are
x = 1,±
√
(
λ2
λ1
)2 − 1− λ2
λ1
. (72)
Denote the latter two solutions as X+ and X−. Easily, one can verify that we can define X as X+ = X−1− = X. We
first point out the relation of X and λ1 here. By Eq. (72), we have
λ1 =
2nX
(X − 1)2 . (73)
Then, combining with Eq. (67), we obtain
O = λ1(1− b) + n = 2nX
(X − 1)2 (1− b) + n. (74)
When n is even:
First, easily one can prove that O = 0 when b = −1, which is denoted by O(−1) = 0. When b = −1, if any |Ri| is not
equal to |Ri+1|, by rearrangement inequity we have∑
i
|Ri||Ri+1| <
∑
i
|Ri||Ri| = 1 (75)
and
b =
∑
i
RiRi+1 > −
∑
i
|Ri||Ri+1| = −1, (76)
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which is contradictory to our assumption that b = −1. Therefore, we must have |Ri| = |Ri+1| and easily one can find
that Ri = −Ri+1 to make b = −1. Then, O(−1) = (
∑
iRi)
2 = 0 when n is even. Finally we have
O(−1) = 0 = 4nX
(X − 1)2 + n. (77)
Solving this we have X = −1, and then λ1 = −n/2. Therefore,
O =
n
2
(b− 1) + n = n
1− cos(pi) (b− 1) + n =
n
1− cos(dn2 e 2npi) (b− 1) + n. (78)
When n is odd:
We first assume X+ 6= X− and therefore X 6= ±1. The formula for Rk in this case should be
Rk = A1 +A2X
k +A3X
−k, (79)
where A1, A2 and A3 are parameters that should be determined. Plug Eq. (79) into Eq. (62) and notice that
X+ +X− = −2λ2λ1 , we have
0 =2
n∑
k=1
Rk + λ1(A1 +A2X
k−1 +A3X−(k−1) +A1 +A2Xk+1 +A3X−(k+1)) + 2λ2Rk
=2
n∑
k=1
Rk + λ1(2A1 +A2X
k(X− +X+) +A3X−k(X− +X+)) + 2λ2Rk
=2
n∑
k=1
Rk + 2(λ1 + λ2)A1 − 2λ2(A2Xk +A3X−k) + 2λ2(A2Xk +A3X−k)
=2
n∑
k=1
Rk + 2(λ1 + λ2)A1 .
(80)
Additionally, because of Eq. (64), we have
n∑
k=1
Rk = nA1. (81)
In the meantime we can just sum up Rk to get
∑n
k=1Rk as
n∑
k=1
Rk = nA1 =
n∑
k=1
(A1 +A2X
k +A3X
−k). (82)
Therefore,
n∑
k=1
(A2X
k +A3X
−k) = 0, (83)
A2
X(1−Xn)
1−X +A3
X−1(1−X−n)
1−X−1 = 0, (84)
A3 = A2
X −Xn+1
1−X−n = −A2X
n+1. (85)
On the other hand, we have
n∑
k=1
RkRk+1 =
n−1∑
k=1
RkRk+1 +RnR1 = A
2
2L1(X) +A
2
1n = b , (86)
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where
L1(X) =
(−X2 + 2X + 1)X2n + (−nX4 + n+X4 + 2X3 − 2X − 1)Xn −X4 − 2X3 +X2
X2 − 1 . (87)
Therefore,
A22 =
b−A21n
L1(X)
. (88)
Plug A22 in the the summation of R
2
k
n∑
k=1
R2k = A
2
1n−
2A22X
(−X2n+1 + n (X2 − 1)Xn +X)
X2 − 1 = 1, (89)
then we have
A21n−
2(b−A21n)X
(−X2n+1 + n (X2 − 1)Xn +X)
L1(X)(X2 − 1) = 1. (90)
Also, notice that O = (
∑n
k=1Rk)
2 = n2A21 and Eq. (74). We have
n2A21 =
2nX
(X − 1)2 (1− b) + n. (91)
Combine Eq. (90) and Eq. (91), we have
0 = − 2bnX
(X − 1)2 +
2nX
(X − 1)2 + n− n
2A21
=
2(b− 1)nX(X + 1)2 (X −Xn) (Xn − 1)
(X − 1)2 ((3X + 1)X2n + (X + 1) (n(X − 1)2 − (X + 1)2)Xn + (X + 3)X2) .
(92)
A necessary condition for the above equation is
2(1− b)nX2(X + 1)2 (Xn−1 − 1) (Xn − 1) = 0, (93)
or equivalently,
X = 0, X = −1, X = eimn 2pi, X = ei mn−1 2pi. (94)
We needs to find out which solution of X to adopt. Define t as X = eit. Then we have
2X
(X − 1)2 =
2eit
(−1 + eit)2 =
1
cos(t)− 1 (95)
and
O =
n
1− cos(t) (b− 1) + n. (96)
Obviously X 6= 0 because X 6= −1, t 6= pi. O(b) is maximized when 1− cos(t) is maximized and t mod 2pi should be
as closed to pi as possible. Here, we assume n > 3 first. For the case n = 3 it is trivial to see the result is the same.
If X = ei
m
n−1 2pi, O is maximized when t = pi± 2pin−1 . If X = ei
m
n 2pi, O is maximized when t = pi± pin , which is closer to
pi than t = pi ± 2pin−1 . Therefore O is maximized when
t = pi ± pi
n
=
n+ 1
n
pi. (97)
Therefore,
O(b) =
n
1− cos(n+1n pi) (b− 1) + n = n1− cos(dn2 e 2npi) (b− 1) + n. (98)
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Finally, we must deal with the condition when X+ = X− = X = −1. We will prove X 6= −1. Notice that, in this
case, when b = −1, by Eq. (74), O must be zero.
Rk = A1 + (A2 +A3k)(−1)k. (99)
Because O = 0,
n∑
k=1
Rk =
1
2
(2A1n−A3n− 2A2 −A3) = 0, (100)
A1 =
A3n+ 2A2 +A3
2n
. (101)
Calculate
∑n
k=1R
2
k and
∑n
k=1RkRk+1 and substitute A1 by above equation, we have
n∑
k=1
R2k = 1 =A
2
1n+A
2
2n+
1
6
A23n(n+ 1)(2n+ 1) +A3(n+ 1) (A2n−A1)− 2A2A1
=
1
12n
(
n2 − 1) (A23 (4n2 + 6n+ 3)+ 12A3A2(n+ 1) + 12A22) ,
(102)
n∑
k=1
RkRk+1 = −1 =A21n−A1 (A3(n+ 1) + 2A2)−
1
3
(n− 2) (3A3A2(n+ 1) +A23n(n+ 2) + 3A22)
=− 1
12n
(n− 1) (12A3A2 (n2 − 1)+ 12A22(n− 1) +A23(n(4n(n+ 1)− 9)− 3)) .
(103)
By the above two equations we can get
(n− 1) (A23(−(n− 3))(n+ 1)− 6)
6(n+ 1)
= −1, (104)
which has no solution when n = 3. Thus, X 6= −1 when n = 3. Assume n > 3, we have
A23 =
12
(n− 3)(n− 1)(n+ 1) . (105)
Viewing Eq. (102) as a quadratic equation for A2, the discriminant is
∆ =
48n(12 +A23(n− n3))
n2 − 1 =
1728n
(3− n)(n2 − 1) . (106)
Therefore, for n > 3, A2 does not have real solution. Thus, we proved that X 6= −1 for every odd n (n > 1).
In conclusion, for both even and odd n:
O =
n
1− cos(dn2 e 2npi) (b− 1) + n. (107)
Corollary 3. Let R be a vector of n real numbers. Under the condition that
∑n
i=1R
2
i = l (l ∈ (0, 1]) and∑n
i=1RiRi+1 = b (Rn+1 is defined to be R1), the maximum of O = (
∑n
i=1Ri)
2 is
O =
n
1− cos(dn2 e 2npi) (b− l) + nl.
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Proof. Assume the R that maximized O under the condition that
∑n
i=1R
2
i = l and
∑n
i=1RiRi+1 = b. Then the
vector T = R√
l
satisfies the condition that
∑n
i=1 T
2
i = 1 and
∑n
i=1 TiTi+1 =
b
l . By Prop. (3) we know that
(
n∑
i=1
Ti)
2 =
1
l
(
n∑
i=1
Ri)
2 ≤ n
1− cos(dn2 e 2npi) (bl − 1) + n. (108)
If the theorem we want to prove is not true and
(
n∑
i=1
Ri)
2 >
n
1− cos(dn2 e 2npi) (b− l) + nl, (109)
then
(
n∑
i=1
Ti)
2 =
1
l
(
n∑
i=1
Ri)
2 >
n
1− cos(dn2 e 2npi) (bl − 1) + n. (110)
Eq. (108) and Eq. (110) are contradictory and then we prove the theorem.
Theorem 3 (Babai [21]). For any group oracle B there exists a randomized process P acting as follows. On input
g1, . . . , gk ∈ G(Bn) and  > 0, P outputs an element of H = 〈g1, . . . , gk〉 in time polynomial in n+ log 1/ such that
each g ∈ H is output with probability in the range (1/|H| − , 1/|H|+ ).
More experimental results
For the input state 1√
2
(|B〉+ |AB〉) = 1√
2
(|HH〉+ |V V 〉), we present the detailed experimental imaginary matrix of
the outputs here, as shown in Fig. 5.
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FIG. 4. (Color online). Real parts of density matrices of the finial output photons for the case with input state of (|HH〉 +
|V V 〉)/√2. a-c represent the cases of initial state, output photons of a3 and b in E-type interferometer, output photons of
a and b3 in AB-type interferometer without CNOT gate, respectively. e-g represent the cases of output photons of a3 and
b3 in A-type interferometer (with fidelity 92.6 ± 2.4%), a3 and b in B-type interferometer (88.9 ± 0.7%), a and b3 in AB-type
interferometer (88.5 ± 1.2%), respectively. i-k represent the cases of output photons of a4 and b4 in A-type interferometer
(98.0± 0.3%), a4 and b in B-type interferometer (94.4± 0.3%), a and b4 in AB-type interferometer (94.8± 0.9%), respectively.
d, h and l represent the corresponding theoretical predictions.
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FIG. 5. (Color online). Imaginary parts of density matrices of the finial output photons for the case with input state of
1√
2
(|HH〉+ |V V 〉). a-c represent the cases of initial state, output photons of a3 and b in E-type interferometer, output photons
of a and b3 in AB-type interferometer without CNOT gate, respectively. e-g represent the cases of output photons of a3 and
b3 in A-type interferometer, a3 and b in B-type interferometer, a and b3 in AB-type interferometer, respectively. i-k represent
the cases of output photons of a4 and b4 in A-type interferometer, a4 and b in B-type interferometer, a and b4 in AB-type
interferometer, respectively. d, h and l represent the corresponding theoretical predictions.
